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The relationship between sex
discrimination and sexual orientation
discrimination has always been somewhat
of a contested issue. Courts have routinely
declared that they bear no relationship to
one another, while advocates have long
argued that they are one and the same. This
matters because Title VII and other
antidiscrimination laws with similar scope
expressly protect against sex
discrimination, but not against sexual orientation discrimination.
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In a recent, groundbreaking ruling, Videckis v. Pepperdine University
(https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district
courts/california/cacdce/2:2015cv00298/608485/41) , a federal district court has

denounced the line between these two types of discrimination as “illusory and artificial,”
leading it to rule that a claim of sexual orientation discrimination and harassment is
cognizable under Title IX (as it would be under Title VII).
Basketball Players Versus Pepperdine University
This case was brought by Haley Videckis and Layana White, both former members of
Pepperdine’s women’s basketball team who transferred there from Arizona State
University. Same weather, perhaps, but a more hostile climate.
According to the facts alleged in the complaint (which the court had to accept as true
when ruling on Pepperdine’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim), the two
women almost immediately faced hostility because of the perception by those involved in
Pepperdine athletics that they were lesbians. They were peppered (no pun intended) with
questions by the athletic academic coordinator about whether they traveled together (and
if so, whether they pushed their beds together) and whether they went on dates.
When Videckis and White they complained to the women’s basketball coach, he promised
to monitor the players’ meetings with the coordinator to make sure she stuck to academic
lines of questioning. But he never followed through. To the contrary, at a team leadership
meeting, the coach spoke about “lesbianism” and his concerns that it was a problem for
women’s basketball in general and for his team. Lesbianism, he told the players, is why
teams lose.
The plaintiffs allege similar types of hostility from the athletic director and others
involved with the basketball program. White had been promised that Pepperdine would
file an appeal with the NCAA to allow her to play in her first year as a transfer student,
but the paperwork was never filed (though it was for a male basketball player). An athletic
trainer, meanwhile, questioned Videckis about dating women and then falsely accused
Videckis of violating training room rules. The athletic coordinator accused them of
cheating, but no evidence was found to substantiate the claim. The coach told other
players not to live with the plaintiffs because they were bad influences. When Plaintiff
White informed her coach she had raised her GPA to 3.0, the level at which the number of
mandatory study halls went down, he raised the minimum on the spot to 3.2.
The hostility the plaintiffs allege directly interfered with their ability to participate in the
basketball program. Coaches and trainers demanded unusual medical documentation
from them and then, even when the documentation was provided, did not allow them to
https://verdict.justia.com/2015/12/22/distinctionwithoutadifference
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play. Their complaints fell, at best, on deaf ears, and, at worst, on ears inclined to
retaliate.
Let’s assume, as the court was required to do, that everything the plaintiffs described
actually happened. Did Pepperdine violate Title IX?
Title IX Versus Title VII
Plaintiffs brought suit under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, a general
ban on sex discrimination by educational institutions that receive federal funding.
Although Title IX is perhaps best known for its impact on college and high school
athletics (discussed, in part, here (https://verdict.justia.com/2012/06/26/thebig40)
), the statute speaks to all forms of sex discrimination, including disparate treatment and
sexual harassment.
The Supreme Court first applied Title IX to sexual harassment in schools in the case of
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools
(http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/503/60/case.html) (1991). In that case,
a tenthgrade girl complained that her teacher, who was also a coach, had subjected her
to a barrage of sexual harassment, including sexuallyoriented conversations; on three
occasions, he insisted that other teachers release her from class so that he could take her
to a private office and force her to have sex with him. The legal issue was whether the
school district could be forced to pay money damages for its failure to maintain a non
discriminatory environment, and the Court’s answer was yes. In Franklin, the Court
defined hostile environment harassment very similarly to the way it had defined it in
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson
(https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/477/57/case.html) , the 1986 case in
which the Court first held that sexual harassment was a form of intentional sex
discrimination (and therefore actionable) under Title VII.
Although the Supreme Court would later decide that Title IX and Title VII should be
interpreted differently with respect to institutional and employer liability for harassment
(see Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District
(http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/524/274/) (1998) and Davis v.
Monroe County Board of Education
(http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/526/629/) (1999)), courts have
continued to define actionable harassment in similar ways under the two statutes.
The question in the case against Pepperdine is whether discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation is actionable under Title IX. As discussed below, this is a question that
has been extensively litigated under Title VII, less so under Title IX. But, as explained
https://verdict.justia.com/2015/12/22/distinctionwithoutadifference
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above, the Title VII precedents are relevant.
Sexual Orientation Discrimination Versus Sex Discrimination
Title VII is at the heart of federal antidiscrimination law. It prohibits employers with at
least fifteen employees from discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. Notice what is not on this list: sexual orientation. But early on, lawsuits
were brought alleging sexual orientation discrimination. In one wellknown case,
DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph (1979), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that Title VII’s ban on sex discrimination did not encompass sexual orientation
discrimination. Similar rulings followed, from trial and appellate courts in different
jurisdictions.
These rulings have some overlapping qualities. They tend to focus on the lack of
congressional intent—few people, if any, were talking about the harms of sexual
orientation. Or the mere fact that “sexual orientation” is not literally on the list of
protected characteristic. And one of the oftcited concerns is “bootstrapping”—the sin of
trying to attach an uncovered claim to a covered one. But these rulings offer little by way
of analysis about the nature of sex or sexual orientation discrimination (and the ways in
which they might be cut from the same cloth).
Despite those early rulings, many plaintiffs have prevailed in cases in which the essence
of their complaint was sexual orientation discrimination or harassment. These cases
focus on Title VII’s requirement that discrimination be “because of sex.” Two types of
successful claims draw on this language, those based on sex stereotyping and samesex
sexual harassment.
Success has been fueled by two Supreme Court decisions. First, in Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins (https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/490/228/) (1989), the
Court held that reliance on sexrole stereotyping can be an actionable form of
employment discrimination. Thus, a woman who was denied partnership in an
accounting firm at least in part because she was perceived as not feminine enough, had
suffered actionable discrimination. That decision gave legs to claims by effeminate gay
men and masculine lesbians, who could also claim they had been subjected to gender
policing—discriminated against for failing to live up to the expectations for their gender.
Then, in Oncale v. Sundowner Services
(https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/523/75/) (1998), the Court considered a

claim of samesex harassment. The federal appellate court had ruled that such a claim
could never be cognizable under Title VII, regardless of the circumstances, because it
could not satisfy the “because of sex” requirement in the statute. But the Supreme Court
https://verdict.justia.com/2015/12/22/distinctionwithoutadifference
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reversed, holding that the requirement might be met in one of three ways: (i) with
evidence of the perpetrator’s homosexuality; (ii) with evidence that the perpetrator in fact
targeted only members of one sex; or (iii) with evidence that the harassment took the
form of genderrole policing—à la Price Waterhouse—to punish an employee for failing to
live up to traditional gender norms. Oncale has both reinforced the use of Price
Waterhouse in sexual orientation claims and fueled separate claims for harassment
rooted in homosexual desire or gendertargeted bullying. The Ninth Circuit, for example,
in Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises
(http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellatecourts/F3/256/864/526495/) (2001),
held that a male restaurant employee who was discriminated against for carrying his tray
“like a woman” and refusing to have sex with a female waitress had stated an actionable
claim of sex discrimination.
Together, these precedents have allowed plaintiffs in some sexual orientation
discrimination claims to succeed (such as Nichols), but sometimes with ironic
consequences. For example, gays and lesbians who conform to genderrole stereotypes
are less protected from discrimination than those who violate them, but those who violate
those norms are more likely to be blocked by the “bootstrapping” objection. And
transgender plaintiffs have been more successful than gay or lesbian plaintiffs because
the “gender policing” point is more obvious.
Even when courts allow these claims to proceed, they engage very little with the
important question of what sexual orientation discrimination is: animus against people
who defy sexrole expectations by being attracted to someone of the same sex.
This question of how and whether to draw the line between sexual orientation
discrimination and sex discrimination has remained important, as Congress has
repeatedly failed to pass the Employment NonDiscrimination Act, a bill that would
expressly add “sexual orientation” (and, in some versions, “gender identity”) to the list of
characteristics against which employers may not discriminate.
Back to Videckis v. Pepperdine University
The district court in Videckis denounced the stark line that courts have tried to draw
between sex discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination. That distinction, the
court wrote, is “illusory and artificial.” Sexual orientation discrimination, the court
continued, “is not a category distinct from sex or gender discrimination. . . . Claims of
sexual orientation discrimination are gender stereotype claims.”
In reaching this conclusion, the court noted the difficulty prior courts have had in
explaining the difference between the two types of claims—or in defending an insistence
https://verdict.justia.com/2015/12/22/distinctionwithoutadifference
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that they are indeed separate. Courts used words and phrases like “imprecise,” “blurry,”
“difficult to draw,” and “hardly clear” to describe the line separating the two claims. This
court decided that the reason the line is so hard to draw is because it “does not exist, save
as a lingering and faulty judicial construct.”
Moreover, this court explained, the current case law misunderstands the nature of a
discrimination claim. For example, an effeminate male plaintiff should not be protected
because of the way he acts or looks. What makes discrimination illegal is the biased mind
and actions of the employer, regardless of the sexual orientation of the victim. Thus, the
Ninth Circuit (in which this district court sits), in Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel
(http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellatecourts/F3/305/1061/593045/) (2002),
held that an employee’s sexual orientation is irrelevant for Title VII purposes. “It neither
provides nor precludes a cause of action for sexual harassment.” That means an employee
should not have to prove he is gay in order to prevail, but neither should such evidence
prevent him from obtaining redress for discrimination. If he was treated differently
because he was a man—perhaps because he was a man attracted to other men, or a man
with an effeminate style—then he was the victim of discrimination.
Videckis is the first case in which a federal court has held that sexual orientation is sex
discrimination, regardless of the role of stereotyping or the genderrole transgression of
the plaintiff. Earlier this year, the EEOC reached the same conclusion, in Complainant v.
Foxx. There, the agency held squarely, as did the court in Videckis, that all sexual
orientation discrimination is actionable sex discrimination. (Three years earlier, the
EEOC had held that transgender discrimination is sex discrimination, a conclusion also
reached by a small number of federal courts.)
Conclusion
As a result of this ruling (subject to appeal), Videckis and White will have the opportunity
to prove that they were the victims of discrimination. If what they allege is true,
Pepperdine’s hostility to the women’s sexual orientation seems pretty unmistakable. And
the tangible actions allegedly taken against them because of their failure to conform to
standards for (heterosexual) women may well support a retaliation claim as well.
This opinion will stand as an attempt to stem a tide of confusing and often poorly
reasoned rulings. It represents a more sensible application of the Supreme Court’s
principles set forth in Price Waterhouse and Oncale. “We are beyond the day,” the Court
wrote in Price Waterhouse, “when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or
insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group, for ‘[i]n forbidding
employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex
https://verdict.justia.com/2015/12/22/distinctionwithoutadifference
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stereotypes.’” Let thy will be done.
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